OBSERVATIONS ON EGYPT

My old and dear friend, Howard Hart, has kindly allowed me to place his recent essay on the current turmoil in Egypt on my blog. As many of you know, Howard, is a retired, highly decorated, Clandestine Service Officer of the CIA; was station chief in Pakistan, and led the CIA's resistance to the Russian occupation of Afghanistan during the early 1980's. He is certainly the most knowledgeable person I know on the mid-east, and the events of the past decade in that area. He was, unfortunately, instructed by the CIA to remove his blog from the Internet---which he has done.




Observations on Egypt



Several very hopeful developments in Egypt’s internal turmoil strike me as significant, and are important and positive auguries in the on-going saga.

NOTE: I lived through the revolution in Iran that overthrew the Shah and resulted in the emergence of a clerical Islamic dictatorship. While there are some parallels between that revolution and what is happening in Egypt, I see great differences between the two events – differences that will, I believe, result in the emergence of a much “better” (i.e., a more liberal, non-theocratic) government
in Egypt.

First – so far at least – anti-government protest movement is NOT being driven by radical Islamic groups. Significantly, the crowd does not chant “alahu Akbar” (God is Great), the battle cry of the clerical-led revolution in Iran. Rather it focuses on demands for Mubarak to leave and for liberalized political expression. This is a secular rather than a religious-based movement, which, if it continues as such, bodes well for the end result. It looks as though the demonstrations are led by and are largely comprised of the better educated and generally secular Egyptian.

Islamic groups, primarily the “Ikhwan” – the Muslim Brotherhood – will attempt to capture and dominate whatever government emerges from the current struggle. The Ikhwan will no doubt have to be given a role in any government that supplants Mubarak’s autocratic regime, but there is reason to hope that secular leaders will work effectively to restrain it.

Second, in Egypt “the generals” have given clear notice that they will not use force to keep Mubarak in power. The importance of this decision cannot be overstated. It has also apparently denied Mubarak the use of the secret police, his traditional covert instruments of repression – greatly restricting the options available to him. It has also greatly heartened and encouraged the demonstrators, who, unless the decision is reversed, have essentially been given the right to continue their protests.

I think that we may safely assume that the Army’s toleration and “umpiring” of the mass protests was in first predicated on the Army’s determination to survive the political upheaval intact. Then it is dependent on the mob’s continued good behavior. There is a deal here … the Army is saying keep your behavior peaceful and we will not attempt to crush you; and the crowds are accepting these limits on their activity.

It looks to me like there was an abortive effort by Mubarak’s internal security police to introduce violent repressive measure against the crowds: hence the reports of many deaths early in the current drama. This seems to have ended, and I am willing to bet the explanation is that “the generals” saw what was going on and quietly ordered it stopped.

Comment: In Iran the regime has established, under the Revolutionary Guard (the RG - the regime’s organized shock troops) an outfit called the “basij”, a full-blown standing force of well-trained and equipped thugs for use against mobs in “defending” the status quo. This organization gives the regime a tool to beat mobs into submission without involving either main force RG units (which constitute, like Hitler’s SS, a complete well armed military force directly responsible to the Supreme Religious Leader); or the more broadly based Iranian Army. Early in the Obama Administration, which remained silent throughout, the world watched the basij crush potentially regime-changing mass demonstrations in Iran.

There is no such organization in Egypt. In Iran the Shah ultimately had to rely on the Army to put down the masses: it refused, melted away, and the Imperial jig was up.

Comment: I submit that Iran is at present hovering on the knife edge of further mass demonstrations. When – as I believe they will - Egyptians prevail in overthrowing Mubarak, there will be good cause for considerable apprehension on the part of Iran’s religious despotism. Perhaps this time the US will as forcefully support the Iranian cause as we have come to support the Egyptian.


I am quite sure that Egyptian generals have so far adopted their “neutral” stance in large part because they very well remember how the Shah’s conscript soldiers quickly refused to fire on their massed “brothers and sisters,“ and simply threw down their guns and disappeared, leaving the field to radical Khomeini supporters who picked up those guns and became The Power that swept Khomeini to the throne.

The Egyptian Army’s stance is first intended to ensure its survival in post-Mubarak Egypt. Which from our American and western point of view is a very good thing. In my view, if the Army allows itself to enter the fray in support of Mubarak it runs a grave risk of disintegrating. And, it seems to me, “reconstructing” Egypt without the steadying influence of the Army is a recipe for takeover by radical Islamic elements – probably led by the Ikhwan.

Third, Egyptians, certainly those demonstrating, are a much more sensible and intelligent bunch of people than Iranians. I think that most of us who have done time in the Middle East have always found Egyptians to be much more enlightened and sophisticated than their neighbors. Mob hysteria has, unusually, not been a “normal” practice in Egypt, which has traditionally been much more closely connected to Europe (and, since, WW Two, with America) than Iran or Syria. Egyptians are a smart bunch. They have a sense of humor and a practical view of things that is not present in much of their neighborhood. Egyptians are well aware that since emerging from British domination Egyptian democracy has been suppressed by their own leaders. There is no sense in Egypt (as there was in Iran) that “evil foreign powers” created Egyptian despots. Yes, the US and the rest of the world accepted and to one degree or another supported rule by Egypt’s home grown autocrats, but I think that in the main this is recognized as practical realpolitik.

I am suggesting that, absent some dreadful shock, Egypt will emerge from this more democratic and essentially intact.


Projected Developments

There are reports today, 10 February 2011, that major demonstrations are springing up in Alexandria (Egypt’s “other” city) and, potentially even more important, that strikes shutting down businesses and public services are spreading. This could be a critical development, as it shifts the focus of the anti-Mubarak opposition away from the public squares directly into people’s lives. The more such strikes spread the weaker Mubarak becomes. No doubt his government has feverishly worked to avert this, as once the society and economy are seen to be grinding to a halt several things happen.

>> The “opposition” will see these developments as direct evidence of their gathering strength and support, and will increasingly believe that it will prevail in its demands for Mubarak’s departure. In other words, this will foster the growth of the uprising.

>> Tempers will flare, which can result in greatly increased militancy by the crowds, which would challenge the Army’s so far restrained response. It also can encourage radical Islamic (and non-Islamic) elements to launch violent incidents designed to foment mob violence – again straining the Army’s ability to continue its present position of brooding neutrality.

The key to everything is how the Egyptian Army responds to developments. I believe that the Army has served notice on Mubarak that it will for the moment defend his continued presence by taking the non-violent stance it is now adopting. But I suspect that there is some sensible limit to how long and under what circumstances the Army will do this. Mubarak cannot believe that the Army will defend him forever in present circumstances, much less that it would defend him if wide-spread violence developed.

If I am right, the expansion of non-violent protest movements (demonstrations and strikes), and a collapse of Egypt’s day to day economy, would reduce the time the Army is willing to give Mubarak to sort it out on his own. As would the appearance of many more, and more violent, street protests.

My view is that the Army will play its present role for only so long, and that there is some (as yet undefined) balance point, which, when and if tipped, will trigger two things: the Army will eject Mubarak, and declare martial law, under which the politicians (with quiet Army oversight) will attempt to forge a new, more representative government that is not dominated by Islamic ideologues.

I do not doubt that the Mubarak regime is over. It is. I also believe that the current stand-off will collapse within days, as I think that things are beginning, from the Army’s point of view, to sail a bit close to the wind. I think that what will emerge will be a moderate Egypt, albeit an Egypt somewhat less automatically friendly to the US. If that is what comes out of these developments the world will be well served. And … uneasy will lie other crowns and governments in the Middle East.

END